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Martin Heidegger is credited as having offered one of the most 
 thorough phenomenological investigations of the nature of boredom in 
the history of philosophy. Indeed, in his 1929–1930 lecture course, The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (FCM ), 
Heidegger goes to great lengths to distinguish between different types 
of boredom and to explicate their respective characters. Moreover, 
Heidegger, at least within the context of his discussion of profound 
boredom [tiefe Langeweile ], opposes much of the philosophical and lit-
erary tradition on boredom insofar as he articulates how the experience 
of boredom, though disorienting, can be existentially beneficial to us. 
Yet despite the many insights that Heidegger’s discussion of boredom 
offers, it is difficult to make sense of profound boredom within the 
context of contemporary psychological and philosophical research on 
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2     A. Elpidorou and L. Freeman
boredom. That is because profound boredom does not map neatly onto 
either our pre-theoretical understanding of boredom or extant psycho-
logical accounts of boredom.
In this chapter, we undertake a study of the nature of profound 
 boredom with the aim of investigating its place within contemporary 
psychological and philosophical research on boredom. Although bore-
dom used to be a neglected emotional state, that is no longer the case. 
In recent years, boredom’s causal antecedents, effects and concomitants, 
experiential profile, and neurophysiological correlates have become top-
ics of active, rigorous study. The same goes for boredom’s influence on 
behavior, its relationship to self-regulation, and its connection to other 
related affective states. Such a situation provides a ripe opportunity to 
scrutinize Heidegger’s claims and to try to understand them both on 
their own terms and in light of our contemporary understanding of 
boredom.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Sect. 1, we offer a 
 concise overview of the psychology of boredom. There, we distinguish 
between the constructs of state boredom and trait boredom; describe 
their respective natures; and briefly discuss their effects on behavior, 
cognition, and other affective states. In Sect. 2, we turn to Heidegger’s 
account of boredom. Although we discuss the nature of all three kinds 
of boredom, we focus primarily on profound boredom and consider 
the existential and philosophical value that Heidegger ascribes to it. In 
Sect. 3, we address the question of whether profound boredom is indeed 
boredom by comparing it to the ways in which boredom has been 
understood in contemporary psychology and in philosophy. We argue 
that although profound boredom shares some features with such under-
standings, it cannot be seamlessly assimilated to any known category 
of boredom. Such a finding is important. It cannot be assumed that 
Heidegger’s (profound) boredom is identical to either our colloquial 
or scientific understanding of boredom. Nor can one use Heidegger’s 
account of this type of boredom to make general claims about the 
 phenomenon of boredom. All the same, we offer an interpretation of 
profound boredom that retains the characteristics that Heidegger assigns 
to it and allows for a meaningful comparison both to our common 
experience of boredom and to our scientific understanding of it.
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1  Boredom: A Primer
One obstacle that the study of boredom faces, but certainly not the 
only one, is the unfortunate fact that the term “boredom” is polysemic: 
depending on the context, the term both denotes and connotes different 
things (Fenichel 1951, 349; Vodanovich 2003, 589). As such, one can 
draw different, and sometimes even conflicting, conclusions about the 
nature of boredom. For the present purposes, we utilize the distinction 
between state boredom (a transitory affective experience) and trait bore-
dom (a lasting personality trait). Empirically, the distinction has been 
both confirmed and proven to be exceptionally useful. Conceptually, 
the distinction is capable of capturing much of our pre-theoretical grasp 
of boredom—it accounts, inter alia, for the various principles governing 
the application of the concept boredom.1
Consider, first, how the term “boredom” is usually used in everyday 
situations, such as when a child becomes bored with a toy, when you 
find a movie boring, or when patients are bored by having to wait at 
the dentist’s office. In such situations, boredom is understood to be a 
state: namely, a short-lived (i.e., transitory), aversive experience. State 
boredom is characterized by feelings of dissatisfaction, a perception of 
lack of meaning, attentional difficulties, and even an altered perception 
of the passage of time. While bored, one is disengaged with one’s cur-
rent situation and experiences a strong desire to escape from it. In terms 
of its physiological character, boredom is characterized by a decrease 
in arousal, although an increase may also occur. As a low arousal state, 
boredom is disengaging; whereas as a high arousal state, it prepares one 
for action or change.2 All in all, boredom is an unpleasant state from 
which one seeks escape and solace.
Whereas “state boredom” refers to a transitory experience, “trait 
 boredom” is meant to capture a characteristic of agents that persists 
through situational change and which is predictive of one’s behavior. 
Trait boredom is variously described as the “tendency,” “propensity,” 
“disposition,” or “susceptibility” to experience boredom often and 
in a wide range of situations. It is thought to be a lasting personality 
trait and is assessed by multi-item, self-report scales. Several meas-
ures of trait boredom exist in the literature. However, the only two 
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existing measures of trait boredom that are neither limited in scope nor 
lacking in reliability and validity (Vodanovich 2003), are the Boredom 
Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer and Sundberg 1986) and the Boredom 
Susceptibility Scale (ZBS) (Zuckerman 1979). Of these two scales, only 
BPS is a full-scale measure of boredom. As such, we restrict our atten-
tion primarily to findings that involve the use of BPS.
Research on the correlates of trait boredom has demonstrated that 
the propensity to experience boredom is associated with numerous 
harms (for reviews see Elpidorou 2017; Vodanovich 2003; Vodanovich 
and Watt 2016). Boredom proneness (i.e., the construct that BPS 
operationalizes and measures and which is thought to correspond 
to trait boredom) has been positively correlated to poor social rela-
tionships, lower life and job satisfaction, difficulty in finding mean-
ing in one’s life, depression, anger and aggression, anxiety, loneliness, 
and apathy. Individuals prone to boredom experience impulse control 
deficits, and are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior, and are 
prone to drug and alcohol abuse. It has also been suggested that bore-
dom proneness is morally significant insofar as it hinders one’s abil-
ity to live a flourishing life (Elpidorou 2017). And if all of the above 
were not enough, there is even evidence suggesting that too much 
boredom can be an indication of early death (Britton and Shipley 
2010). Understood as a lasting personality trait, boredom is a per-
vasive existential condition. It changes our world, our selves, and our 
relationships to others. It is no surprise then that (trait) boredom  
has the (poor) reputation that it does.
2  Heidegger’s Boredom
Heidegger’s account of boredom appears in the first part of FCM, a 
lecture course delivered in 1929–1930. Prior to the lecture course, the 
only fundamental attunement that Heidegger discussed was anxiety 
(Angst ), which played a key role both in Being and Time (BT ) (1927) 
and in “What Is Metaphysics?” (1929). One aim of FCM was to delin-
eate his conception of philosophy and metaphysics, already evolving 
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8 Is Profound Boredom Boredom?     5
from the one presented in BT. Another aim was to develop his account 
of the fundamental attunement (Grundstimmung ) of boredom in 
order to grasp the fundamental meaning of our being. Importantly, 
he set out to do this not by developing an anthropology or philosophy 
of culture (Kulturphilosophie ) (FCM §18c) but rather by considering 
the ways in which profound boredom is a key step in opening up the 
proper questioning of philosophizing for us.3
On Heidegger’s account, there are three types of boredom, each of 
which corresponds to a distinctive way in which we experience the pas-
sage of time4 and each of which we describe below. They are: (1) becom-
ing bored by something (Gelangweiltwerden von etwas ); (2) being bored 
with something (Sichlangweilen bei etwas ); and (3) profound boredom 
(tiefe Langweile ), which is expressed by the impersonal phrase “it is bor-
ing for one” (es ist einem langweilig ).5 Within this third form of boredom, 
Heidegger makes a distinction between “profound boredom” and “con-
temporary boredom” but he does not flesh it out systematically or with 
much clarity.6 Crucially, each form of boredom manifests in relation to 
how time passes (die Zeit vertreiben ) in that within each form, there are 
two related structural moments: being left empty (Leergelassenheit ) and 
being held in limbo (Hingehaltenheit ). Only by understanding how each 
form of boredom relates to the passage of time and what role each of the 
two structural moments play in the experience of boredom, can we fully 
grasp what boredom is for Heidegger.
2.1  Becoming Bored by Something
Though the first form of boredom is the most familiar to us, it is also, 
according to Heidegger, the most superficial. This form of boredom is 
the experience of being bored by something—person, object, or state of 
affairs—a phenomenon that we all know well. For example, waiting for our 
delayed fight to depart, with no departure time in sight; waiting to see a 
doctor who is running far behind schedule; trying to get off the phone with 
someone who will not stop talking to us; these are all instances of becom-
ing bored by something. Here, boredom is unpleasant and we do whatever 
we can to try to get rid of it. In terms of the two structural moments of 
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 456623_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-24639-6
Chapter No.: 8 Date: 10 July 2019 19:52 Page: 6/27
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boredom, we are held in limbo insofar as our situation does not let us do 
what we intend to do, namely, board our flight, see our doctor, and get on 
with our day. At the same time, we are also left empty insofar as our situa-
tion does not fulfill us; it is not what we want to be doing.
2.2  Being Bored with Something
With the second form of boredom, things become slightly more compli-
cated and slightly more interesting. Whereas with the first form, the object 
of boredom is clear to the one experiencing it, with the second form, it is 
not immediately clear precisely what it is that is boring—it is also not clear 
that one is, in the moment, bored. In order to explain this form of bore-
dom, Heidegger develops an example of going to a dinner party at which 
neither the company, conversation, food, nor the ambiance is perceived by 
us, while at the party, to be boring. However, upon returning home, we 
come to the realization that the evening itself was boring. Here “boring” 
does not denote a subjectively obvious aversive experience; rather, “boring” 
means something like casualness (viz., one of the same, what others do), 
the inauthentic following of a social ideal (FCM 111–112).
In order to fully comprehend the depth of Heidegger’s account 
of the second form of boredom, it is crucial to understand the struc-
tural moment of being held in limbo, which requires us to return to 
the example. That evening, we made the decision to attend the dinner 
party and in so doing, we transformed our relationship to time: both 
by leaving time for ourselves and by taking this time for ourselves. But, 
according to Heidegger, during the party, the time that we have given to 
ourselves comes to stand still and we become trapped in a standing pres-
ent (stehendes Jetzt ). That has happened because our choice of activity 
disconnected us from our past and future projects. Stuck in this stand-
ing present, our comportment to originary temporality changes and the 
significance of the full temporal horizon is lost (FCM 124). By not pur-
suing an activity that is meaningful to us, we are held in limbo.
Furthermore, by immersing ourselves in activities that are not our 
own, we are left empty. But the emptiness is not directly caused by 
something in the surrounding; rather, it arises as a result of having left 
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8 Is Profound Boredom Boredom?     7
behind (Sichzurücklassen ) our authentic, temporal, existential self. Our 
situation does not fulfill us; it does not contribute to the completion of 
our projects, nor does it relate to our having-been. We spend our time; 
give it up; and in doing so, we make it stand.
2.3  Profound Boredom
Whereas with the first form of boredom, a determinate object or sit-
uation is the source of our boredom, with the second form, boredom 
arises both from the particular situation and from ourselves. There 
is an additional form of boredom which is the most profound of all. 
According to Heidegger, it is also the most perplexing.
The reason why the third form of boredom is both the most pro-
found and the most perplexing is because in it, there is nothing in 
particular that is boring, nor is there a determinate cause of or reason 
why one is bored. And yet still, everything bores us, even ourselves. The 
impersonal construction “it is boring for one”—where “it” [es ] is the 
same subject found in expressions such as “it is raining” or “it is hot”—
is Heidegger’s way of expressing the ubiquity of profound boredom. It 
is limitless and depersonalized. It is neither me, nor you who experi-
ences this form of boredom; rather, Dasein becomes an “undifferenti-
ated no one” (FCM 135). We stand without any concerns and interests. 
All identifying characteristics, history, and projects are stripped away. 
Profound boredom is unconditioned, overpowering, and extreme. In it, 
the passing of time is altogether missing. That is to say, all three tempo-
ral dimensions (past, present, future) merge into a unified temporality 
and beings as a whole withdraw. In their withdrawal, they lose all sig-
nificance which means not only that everything around and alongside 
us is drained of meaning; it also means that nothing carries any future 
prospects for us and that nothing relates to or gives meaning to our past 
(having-been). One thus grows indifferent to who and what one was, 
is, and will be. And yet, contrary to the first form of boredom which 
one actively tries to escape, in this third form of boredom, one does not 
respond by trying to distract oneself or to escape from it. There is sim-
ply no point in resisting profound boredom. No thing, no being, no 
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situation matters to us. In the midst of profound boredom, we stand 
entirely indifferent to everything and everyone.
Because nothing matters to us and we are unable to become 
involved in anything, profound boredom leaves us empty. Because one’s 
 possibilities are foreclosed, profound boredom holds us in limbo. Yet 
counter-intuitively, these two structural moments do not lead to 
despair. Rather, in withdrawing and thereby losing their significance—a 
kind of concealing—entities in the world and Dasein’s own unexploited 
possibilities suddenly and paradoxically reveal themselves to Dasein. 
“All telling refusal [Versagen ],” Heidegger writes, “is in itself a telling 
[Sagen ], i.e., a making manifest” (FCM 140). When the pressing world 
of everyday concern fades into indifference, the world is made pres-
ent to us anew. In that moment of totalizing boredom, we can come 
to understand what projects carry proper significance to us—that is, we 
can discern the projects that are related to our past and that define us, 
both in the present and in the future. In doing so, we come to under-
stand not only that we are the type of being for whom existence is an 
issue, but also that we can take up and appropriate (at least to a certain 
extent) our own existence. As such, profound boredom drives Dasein to 
enact its ownmost possibilities in what Heidegger calls the “Augenblick, ” 
the instant or “moment of vision” in which Dasein faces itself as the 
kind of being it is—a power to take over its ground and to choose what 
it will be (FCM 149). The revelatory moment of profound boredom 
is Dasein’s being called toward its authentic self-disclosure wherein it 
is brought face to face with itself and its temporal freedom. That is, in 
profound boredom, Dasein has the opportunity to become authentic.
3  Understanding Profound Boredom
How well does Heidegger’s discussion of boredom align with what we 
know about boredom from psychology? We can make two quick obser-
vations. First, the first form of boredom (becoming bored by something ) 
appears to be akin to state boredom, although Heidegger would not call 
it a “state” (BT §29; FCM 63–68; Elpidorou and Freeman 2015). In 
other words, what Heidegger describes as the most superficial kind of 
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boredom is our ordinary experience of boredom. For both Heidegger 
and psychological accounts, this form of boredom is an aversive expe-
rience that signifies a failure to engage with or to be engaged by one’s 
environment in a desired manner despite one’s desire to do so. In this 
kind of boredom, we want to be doing something other than what we 
are currently doing. We feel trapped or are held in limbo in a situation 
that does not provide us with meaningful possibilities. And precisely 
because of this unavailability of meaningful possibilities, we are left 
empty.
Second, the second form of boredom (being bored with something ) 
does not appear to be an affective experience proper. That is, it is not 
an experience that is primarily characterized by an affective or qualita-
tive character. As Heidegger tells us, “There is nothing at all to be found 
that might have been boring about this evening, neither the conversa-
tion, nor the people, nor the rooms” (FCM 109). Instead, the second 
form of boredom appears to be a type of cognitive attitude: the retro-
active realization that we wasted our time. During the experience of 
this boredom, we are given hints that we are bored (“[j]ust as we are 
on the verge of playing with our watch chain or a button, cigars are 
passed around again” [FCM 11–12]), but those hints are not recog-
nized by us at the time as symptoms of the presence of an unsatisfactory 
activity. Instead, we carry on with the activity that we had chosen to 
pursue and only after the activity concludes do we realize that what we 
had done was a waste of time. It was, for Heidegger, literally a waste 
of our time, the time that is Dasein. By agreeing to go to the party, to 
continue with Heidegger’s example, we have immersed ourselves in an 
activity that is not our own—we decided to go along, to embrace “cas-
ualness” as Heidegger puts it, and thus, to do as others do (FCM 114). 
We have allowed ourselves to be fully absorbed by a present that is dis-
connected from our past and future. The party neither promotes our 
projects nor meaningfully stems from or relates to our past. As such, it 
is not an authentic activity. Thus, the party was boring but not because 
it felt boring. It was boring because we came to realize that it was not 
meaningful to us. The psychology of boredom does not study this retro-
active experience of boredom that Heidegger highlights, at least not by 
this name. All the same, given the intimate relationship that boredom 
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bears to the perception of meaninglessness (Van Tilburg and Igou 2011, 
2012), the second form of boredom can be recognized as boredom, 
even if it is not the typical (self-luminous)7 form of boredom and even 
if it is predicated on our attitudes regarding what is valuable, meaning-
ful, or fulfilling to us.
Matters become much more complicated, however, when we turn 
our attention to profound boredom. Is profound boredom state bore-
dom, trait boredom, or something else, perhaps a distinctive kind of 
experience that is captured neither by our ordinary nor by the scientific 
understanding of boredom? In what follows, we consider these three 
possibilities in order.
3.1  State Boredom Is Not Profound Enough
The differences between state boredom and profound boredom are both 
important and numerous. To begin with, state boredom is thought to 
be an emotion: a relatively short-lived, flexible, multi-dimensional 
response to specific physical and social situations. Emotions are typically 
initiated by an individual’s appraisal of an event that bears some per-
sonal significance to the individual. Such an appraisal can be either con-
scious or unconscious and it gives rise to a set of interrelated responses 
in the individual—such as changes in felt experiences, physiology, 
facial expressions, perception, cognition, and action. But Heidegger 
is quite clear that profound boredom is not an emotion but a funda-
mental mood (Grundstimmung ). As a mood (Stimmung ), boredom is 
the ontic manifestation of Befindlichkeit—a basic structure of Dasein’s 
existence that makes engagement with the world possible (BT §29; 
Elpidorou and Freeman 2015; Ratcliffe 2013; Slaby 2015). Moods are 
the various, specific, and pre-reflective ways in which the world is dis-
closed to us and the background horizon or context through which we 
understand and make sense of the world and of ourselves. Importantly, 
they reveal the world as mattering to us and in doing so, they are the 
necessary conditions for our emotional existence (Freeman 2014). As 
understood in psychology, boredom would then be that which arises 
on account of the fact that as human beings we are already mooded. 
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The psychology of boredom studies, one might say, the symptoms 
of our affective existence. Heidegger’s discussion of boredom as a 
Stimmung attempts to explicate what makes such an affective existence 
possible (Freeman 2014).
But boredom is not just one Stimmung among others; it is a 
Grundstimmung, a fundamental or grounding mood. Indeed, it is fun-
damental in at least two senses. First, it is fundamentally revealing of 
the nature of our human existence. In profound boredom, we stand dis-
connected from our world of concerns and we ‘see’ ourselves for what 
we really are—as a power or potentiality to seize our own existence in a 
way that is meaningful to us. Second, profound boredom is  distinctive 
insofar as it is a preparatory mood for philosophical inquiry. Only 
once this mood has been awakened in us, will we be in a position to 
study and understand the fundamental concepts of metaphysics (world, 
 finitude, and solicitude).
State boredom lacks the features that make profound boredom a 
Grundstimmung. This is not say that state boredom is not revealing of 
anything; it is (Elpidorou 2018a). Nevertheless, state boredom does 
not appear to be ‘deep’ in any sense. State boredom arises often and 
in various contexts without revealing anything about the ground (or 
lack thereof ) of our existence, our being, or our temporality. If one is 
made to wait long enough, one’s dentist appointment can be a lesson 
in patience or frustration, but not in ontology. Relatedly, state boredom 
does not have the philosophical significance that profound boredom is 
thought to have. We find nothing in our common everyday experience 
of boredom that is necessary, preparatory, or even congenial to meta-
physical thinking. The existential and philosophical functions of pro-
found boredom are related. Metaphysics is not a theoretical enterprise 
but “a fundamental way of Da-sein” (FCM 23). The questioning that 
metaphysics involves and requires is comprehensive. We too fall under 
its scope and as such we are affected by it (FCM 24). Insofar as state 
boredom fails to disclose to us the nature of our being, it fails to affect 
us in this profound way. Insofar as it fails to affect us in any profound 
way, it fails to prepare us for metaphysical inquiry, which is after all the 
explicit aim of Heidegger’s lecture course.8
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The realization that state boredom does not seem capable of doing 
the philosophical work that Heidegger wants profound boredom to do 
is underscored by yet another difference between the two. Profound 
boredom is totalizing. It affects every aspect of our existence. It makes 
every characteristic of our existence (present, past, or future) irrelevant 
to us and in so doing, renders us an “undifferentiated no one” (FCM 
135). State boredom does none of those things. On the contrary, state 
boredom typically depends on our situation and as a consequence, 
can be easily alleviated by a change in situation, action, or even way 
of thinking. Precisely because state boredom lacks the comprehen-
sive scope of profound boredom, it fails to have profound boredom’s 
 existential and philosophical import. Simply put, state boredom is not 
profound enough. It does not shake us up. It does not reveal ourselves 
as potentiality or as a power to choose. It does not motivate us to take 
up our lives anew.
3.2  Trait Boredom Is Too Negative, Too Personal
A comparison between state boredom and profound boredom quickly 
revealed that state boredom is not profound enough to be profound 
boredom. Such a realization suggests that if profound boredom is to be 
identified with a different type of boredom, then that type of boredom 
must be more extreme. Trait boredom meets this requirement. First, 
individuals who are thought to possess the trait of boredom often and 
easily find themselves to be bored, even in situations that others typi-
cally find interesting and stimulating. Second, trait boredom can affect 
one’s existence in profound ways. For instance, it can affect one’s hab-
its and actions. And it can render one’s personal, professional, and 
inter-personal life uninteresting. As such, trait boredom carries the 
potential to be existentially or ontologically informative, insofar as it 
can reveal to us both the various ways in which we relate to the world 
and how such relations may languish. Third, and most importantly, trait 
boredom, just like profound boredom, is totalizing. Individuals possess-
ing the trait of boredom can experience the totality of their world as 
boring. Such a feature of trait boredom is not only corroborated by the 
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way in which trait boredom is assessed, but also by testimonies from 
individuals who experience their lives and worlds as boring. Consider, 
for example, the following first-personal testimonies reported by 
Bargdill in his phenomenological study of life boredom.
Presently, I am bored with my whole life. None of the old things I used 
to do bring enjoyment to me anymore. Nothing. [Boredom] covers my 
social life. It covers school. It covers work. It covers going to the grocery 
store . . . It covers a lot of things. My hair. (Bargdill 2000, 198)
I might think that I would become bored with whatever activity I’m look-
ing at. I project boredom. I’m looking ahead and saying ‘Oh boy, it looks 
like it’s going to be boring after all.’ So I don’t even start it. (ibid.)
Although Bargdill does not describe these individuals as ones who 
 possess the personality trait of boredom, it is very plausible, given how 
trait boredom is assessed, that these individuals would be categorized as 
boredom prone individuals by the Boredom Proneness Scale (Farmer 
and Sundberg 1986). In other words, although Bardgill’s focus is on 
what he calls “life boredom,” this notion can be understood to be a a 
proxy for trait boredom.
Trait boredom appears to be totalizing. It is thus profound. But is it 
profound in Heidegger’s sense of profound boredom? The answer to this 
question is no. First, trait boredom is related to the frequent experience 
of state boredom. In other words, one is said to be prone to boredom 
(i.e., one possesses the trait of boredom) only if one experiences state 
boredom frequently and in a wide range of situations. When we turn 
to Heidegger’s account, we find no discernible relationship between 
profound boredom and how frequently one experiences boredom (state 
or otherwise). If anything, it seems that profound boredom, given its 
existential import and effects, is a rare occurrence. Although one might 
argue that in order to experience the whole world as boring, one needs 
to experience boredom often and in all situations, this is not how 
Heidegger describes profound boredom. Profound boredom “can occur 
out of the blue, and precisely whenever we do not expect it at all” (FCM 
135). Profound boredom comes with no warnings and it is not causally 
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14     A. Elpidorou and L. Freeman
related to the first form of boredom. But assuming that the first type of 
boredom is, as we argued, state boredom, then even though profound 
boredom does not require state boredom, trait boredom does. After all, 
trait boredom is predicated on the frequent experience of state bore-
dom. Thus, whereas trait boredom is both conceptually and  causally 
dependent on state boredom, profound boredom is not.
Second, trait boredom is understood to be a lasting personality trait. 
As a personality trait, trait boredom is grounded in one’s  psychological 
or biological characteristics and is used to account for differences 
between individuals that cannot be accounted for in terms of situational 
factors. Precisely because trait boredom is a personality trait, the task of 
showing how it can have the ontological ‘weight’ of profound boredom 
becomes extremely difficult. Not every individual possesses this person-
ality trait, yet profound boredom is something that can be experienced 
by everyone. After all, profound boredom “is rooted in time — in the 
time that we ourselves are” (FCM 133). Profound boredom arises out 
of the most fundamental features of human existence—namely, our 
care structure (our thrown and situated projection). Consequently, any 
attempt to assimilate profound boredom into trait boredom runs the 
risk of conflating two levels that Heidegger wants to keep separate: the 
psychological/biological and the ontological.9
Third, trait boredom is pathological: it is related to a host of issues 
that are incongruent with Heidegger’s contention that profound 
boredom can lead one to an authentic existence. This feature of trait 
boredom becomes most clear when we turn again to first-person 
descriptions by individuals who experience chronic or life boredom. 
Consider the following testimonies:
I feel I lack a sense of purpose, and completeness. Most of all I feel 
extremely bored. Bored of everything—work, friends, hobbies, relation-
ships, music, reading, movies, bored all the time. I do things [merely] to 
occupy my time, to distract myself from trying to discover the meaning 
of my existence, and I would gladly cease to do anything if the opportu-
nity arose. No matter what the activity is it leaves me feeling unfulfilled [….] 
What possible difference does it ultimately make whatever I do? What differ-
ence does anything make? (Maltsberger 2000, 84; emphasis added)
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When I lose my vision, I lose any idea or projection of what I want to do 
in the future. I don’t have any distinct plans, or even an idea of what I 
want to do and so I wanted to immerse myself more in the present rather 
than projecting myself in the future… (Bargdill 2000, 199)
Being in the disillusioned state I didn’t have the will power to be 
 disciplined. I knew what I was getting into, but I just didn’t care. 
(Bargdill 2000, 200)
Trait boredom may bring about a totalizing experience of boredom: 
everything and everyone is boring to one. Yet precisely because of its 
totalizing nature, this form of boredom has the opposite result of pro-
found boredom. The experience of totalizing boredom that can come 
about as a result of constant and pervasive boredom is accompanied not 
by a will to reaffirm authentically one’s existence, but by an inability 
both to project possibilities for oneself and to act. The Dasein who is 
characterized by trait boredom might experience the total withdrawal of 
beings described by Heidegger. It would, in that case, be held in limbo 
and left empty by the world. Nothing would interest Dasein; nothing 
would seem as significant or meaningful to it. Yet, unlike profound 
boredom, such boredom is not motivating but incapacitating. It does 
not lead to resoluteness or authentic existence. In fact, given the host 
of physical, psychological, and social harms that are correlated with its 
presence, the truth is very much the opposite. Thus, profound boredom 
cannot be trait boredom. It cannot serve its existential function.
3.3  Profound Boredom as Sui Generis
A third possibility is that profound boredom is something entirely 
different from both our ordinary experience of boredom and our 
 psychological conceptions of it: namely, it is sui generis. Prima facie, 
there seem to be at least two reasons in support of this reading and 
such reasons are not affected by the fact that Heidegger calls profound 
boredom “boredom”—after all, in the mid-to-late 1920s, Heidegger is 
known for claiming that though he is using ordinary words and con-
cepts in his thinking (e.g., “care,” “guilt”), the meaning of these terms is 
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importantly different from our ordinary understanding of them (given 
their place and role in fundamental ontology).
First, as Heidegger makes clear throughout the mid-to-late 1920s and 
then again at the end of his career in the Zollikon Seminars (Zo ), the 
empirical sciences in general and psychology in particular do not engage 
with the same questions that he is asking; they tell us nothing about 
fundamental attunement or ontological modes of being. Rather, the 
empirical sciences study the psychological states of a subject. But Dasein 
is neither a subject (in any traditional sense of the term “subject”) nor 
the subject of psychology. Moreover, fundamental attunement is not a 
psychological state but rather, the condition for the possibility of such 
states. On Heidegger’s account, to focus on the psychological states of 
a subject is to miss the disclosive capacities of attunement—both as an 
ontological structure (Befindlichkeit ) and in its various concrete man-
ifestations (moods [Stimmungen ]). And it is precisely this character of 
attunement that interests Heidegger insofar as his thinking in the mid-
to-late 1920s aims to interrogate the nature and structure of Dasein in 
the service of answering the question of the meaning of being. Studying 
psychological states get us nowhere on the path to answering this 
question.
Second, Heidegger’s main question in the context of which his 
account of boredom arises is not “what is boredom and why do we 
experience it?” Rather, it is “what is metaphysics (or philosophy) and 
what is the condition for the possibility of philosophizing?” His answer 
to this question is that boredom is the experience which catalyzes our 
capacity to do metaphysics and in the end, to become our authentic 
selves. Consequently, his account of boredom is instrumental to under-
standing the real question that interests him—“what is metaphysics (or 
philosophy) and how and in what mood can we best pursue it?” This 
question can only be understood through the lens of his underlying 
philosophical undertaking. Psychological states as understood by psy-
chologists are not studied in terms of their relationship with the project 
of philosophizing or of doing metaphysics.
These two reasons can be brought together by considering 
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication [formale Anzeige ], characteristic 
of his phenomenological method from that period.10 It was Heidegger’s 
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contention that theoretical and objectifying discourse tends to misrep-
resent or distort its own content primarily because it treats its subject 
matter as something present-at-hand (PIA 21). In order to avoid this 
misinterpretation or distortion, Heidegger deems it necessary to treat 
phenomenological concepts as formal indications. Unlike the objec-
tifying concepts that are found in the positive sciences and in philos-
ophy, phenomenological concepts as formal indications do not fully 
communicate or determine their content. Formal indications are indic-
ative insofar as they furnish us with a sense of direction and allow us to 
undertake our phenomenological investigation (GA 63, 80; PIA 25). At 
the same time, they are also formal insofar as they do not specify or pre-
determine the object of investigation. As Heidegger states, “the formal 
indication functions both…to guide as well as to deter in various ways” 
(PIA 105). With respect to its “deterring” or “prohibiting” function, the 
method of formal indication
prevents every drifting off into autonomous, blind, dogmatic attempts to 
fix the categorial sense, attempts which would be detached from the pre-
supposition of the interpretation, from its preconception, its nexus, and 
its time, and which would then purport to determine an objectivity in 
itself, apart from a thorough discussion of its ontological sense. (ibid.)
Indeed, the sense of a formally indicative concept is not something that 
can be theoretically given or retrieved, since the very point of formally 
indicating something is to get at a truth rooted in a more fundamental 
concealment that is central to our existence (see also Polt 1999). Rather 
than capture the essence of a thing and give an account of it with perfect 
accuracy, formally indicative concepts nudge us to pay more attention to 
things; they bring to the fore something more basic than what science 
can reveal, namely, they underscore the very fact that we find ourselves 
in a meaningful world. For Heidegger, what we cannot speak about 
theoretically, we must indicate formally. But doing so involves more 
than a saying or pointing: we can come to terms with the phenomena 
under investigation only by undertaking a type of enactment or per-
formance (see Dahlstrom 1994; Granberg 2003). Properly understood, 
philosophy is a type of comportment (PIA 41–42, 46–47) and formal 
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indication is a call to philosophize by taking anew the question of being. 
Thus, what “boredom” as a phenomenological concept formally indi-
cates is something that is both distinct from scientific and ordinary con-
ceptions of boredom and ultimately connected to philosophizing.
There are thus reasons to support the position that profound bore-
dom is something entirely other than both our everyday experience of 
boredom and the psychological state or trait revealed by the methods of 
the empirical sciences. Still, we cannot unqualifiedly agree with such a 
reading of profound boredom. Even though such a reading highlights 
the distinctive ways in which Heidegger is conceiving of boredom, it 
runs into important philosophical and interpretative difficulties.
First, if profound boredom is sui generis, then the text is rendered 
methodologically problematic: why would Heidegger consider the 
first two forms of boredom that do in some way resemble our ordinary 
experience of the phenomenon before addressing profound boredom if 
profound boredom has no relation to them and to our experience of 
boredom? The “methodological” issue that we are raising here is not 
a concern with Heidegger’s use of formal indication.11 Instead, it is a 
worry of how to understand the third form of boredom if not through 
some kind of understanding of or familiarity with the first two forms of 
boredom. In other words, even if Heidegger’s method of formal indica-
tion allows him to treat profound boredom as something different than 
ordinary boredom, it still does not allow him to treat it as an entirely 
alien form of boredom, completely disconnected from the everyday 
experience of boredom (SZ 310). In its formally indicative guise, “bore-
dom” would still share something in common with our everyday usage 
of the term and it is precisely because of this commonality and famil-
iarity that it is capable of serving its indicative function. In fact, for-
mal indications are not typically neologisms or terms of art (Dahlstrom 
1994, 785), but concepts that are closely related to and derived from 
ordinary experiences and linguistic practices. Moreover, if profound 
boredom were sui generis, then the intricate structure of the part of 
the lecture course that discusses the character of each type of boredom 
would fall apart. That is because Heidegger understands all three forms 
of boredom in terms of their relationship to time and in terms of their 
two-fold structure (being held in limbo and being left empty ). Insofar 
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8 Is Profound Boredom Boredom?     19
as all three forms of boredom are related in this double manner, it is 
hard to insist that profound boredom is a sui generis experience, entirely 
unrelated from the first two types of boredom.
Second, there is an ontological (or an in virtue of ) relationship 
between the first type of boredom and profound boredom. Though the 
first form of boredom is not the causal antecedent of profound bore-
dom, the latter is the condition for the possibility of the former:
The first form of boredom as such can indeed never pass over into the 
third, yet conversely, the first is itself presumably still rooted in the 
possibility of the third, and comes from the third form of boredom with 
respect to its possibility in general. (FCM 156)
But if profound boredom is the condition for the possibility of the first, 
and the first is our ordinary experience of boredom, then the two can-
not be unrelated.
Third, although profound boredom might not be identical to state 
and trait boredom, there are still important and undeniable simi-
larities between them. Heidegger is quite clear that he is not con-
cerned with psychological states (qua psychological states) (FCM 
63–68); rather, his philosophical enterprise—phenomenology and 
fundamental ontology—aims to ask questions that are fundamen-
tal to our experiences in the world and to understand and under-
score the condition for their possibility. All the same, it is incorrect 
to hold that Heidegger completely rejects the sciences—this is espe-
cially the case with regard to the second part of FCM where he uses 
biology to support ontological claims. Most importantly, elements 
of profound boredom seem to be present in experiences of boredom 
ordinarily understood and in scientific, empirical accounts of them. 
For example, profound boredom is constituted by a lack of mean-
ing, disengagement from one’s goals and projects, and an altered 
perception of time. But these elements are also present in varying 
degrees in both trait boredom and state boredom, as discussed above. 
If profound boredom were in fact sui generis, then we would not 
be able to recognize elements of it in the other types of boredom.
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Finally, to claim that profound boredom is sui generis raises a pressing 
metaphilosophical concern: namely, if it is sui generis, then Heidegger’s 
account of profound boredom loses part of its significance, both as a 
phenomenological study of the (common) experience of boredom and 
as a philosophical contribution to the study of boredom. If profound 
boredom were not an experience that bore any relationship to our ordi-
nary experience of boredom, then what would be the point of studying 
it? Would it even be something that we could ever experience or under-
stand? And if it were something completely other, what could it ever 
teach us about ordinary boredom? On account of these four reasons, the 
claim that profound boredom is sui generis should not be accepted.
4  Locating Profound Boredom
Profound boredom is equivalent neither to our ordinary conception 
of boredom nor to any of the scientific constructs that carry the name 
“boredom.” For those who are familiar with Heidegger’s thinking, such 
a conclusion will not be surprising. Ontology or fundamental ontology 
for Heidegger is not science. The latter could never unearth the truths 
of the former. And although Heidegger employs ordinary, everyday con-
cepts in his thinking, he appropriates them (at least in the late 1920s 
and afterwards) and shows that there is much more to them than ini-
tially meets the eye. Our conclusion then is not surprising. But that 
does not mean that it is not important. Indeed, as we have also shown, 
understanding profound boredom as something completely distinct 
from our everyday and scientific notions of boredom yields a position 
that is replete with difficulties. It threatens to make parts of Heidegger’s 
lecture course methodologically otiose and runs the risk of rendering 
Heidegger’s view a mere historical curiosity—one that is endemic to 
Heidegger and which stands disconnected from both ordinary human 
experience and other philosophical accounts of boredom. Heidegger’s 
account of boredom thus occupies a precarious position: it can neither 
be assimilated to what we know about boredom nor can it be taken to 
be describing a sui generis kind of boredom. How, then, should one 
proceed?
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We offer a conciliatory reading. We acknowledge both that profound 
boredom is neither state boredom nor trait boredom, and yet that 
 profound boredom is also not sui generis. Still, such a conclusion is not 
entirely negative. Our comparative analysis of profound boredom, state 
boredom, and trait boredom reveals important features of profound 
boredom that can be understood in light of our more familiar types of 
boredom.
We mentioned above that despite its severity, profound boredom is 
not an incapacitating experience. When one experiences profound bore-
dom, though one becomes disconnected from one’s own being or self 
(Dasein), one also comes to realize one’s authentic being anew. In this 
way, profound boredom is motivational. It propels us to become the 
author of our own lives, to choose what is proper to us. State boredom 
does something similar, albeit less drastic. A variety of theoretical and 
empirical considerations on the nature of state boredom strongly sug-
gest that it is a regulatory state that aims to keep one in line with one’s 
projects (Elpidorou 2014, 2018a, b). The experience of boredom moti-
vates one to cease to be engaged with one’s current situation and instead 
to pursue an alternative situation that is more satisfactory, attractive, or 
meaningful. Just like profound boredom, state boredom is capable of 
bringing us closer to situations and activities that are in line with our 
own interests, goals, and desires.
Furthermore, the onset of boredom has been shown to be capable of 
triggering meaning reestablishment strategies that affect an individual’s 
behavior and cognition (Van Tilburg and Igou 2011, 2012). Clearly, the 
desire to find meaning that arises out of the experience of boredom and 
in an attempt to alleviate its experience could be a useful attitude to 
have while philosophizing. State boredom is not necessarily  anathema 
to philosophizing. Indeed, it seems that in some cases it could be 
 precisely what gets us there.
Though these similarities between state boredom and profound are 
important, they are not perfect (e.g., the motivating effect of profound 
boredom does not compare to that of state boredom) nor are they suffi-
cient to render the two one and the same. Furthermore, as we discussed 
above, state boredom is not profound enough. It is not totalizing nor is 
it necessarily existentially meaningful. Still, those features of profound 
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boredom are found in trait boredom, even if trait boredom is not pro-
found boredom. The situation thus appears to be as follows. Profound 
boredom is not state boredom nor is it trait boredom. Yet, profound 
boredom could be understood as involving features of both types or 
conceptions of boredom. Just like state boredom, profound boredom is 
motivating and capable of promoting authentic existence. Just like trait 
boredom, it is severe, totalizing, and existentially revealing (see Table 1).
To suggest that it is fruitful to understand profound boredom as 
involving features of both state and trait boredom is not to reduce pro-
found boredom to either state or trait boredom. Our proposed inter-
pretation of profound boredom aims to help us understand both its 
nature and its relationship to our common experience and scientific 
conception of boredom. As such, our interpretation highlights the ways 
in which Heidegger’s account of profound boredom offers a distinctive, 
but not alien, kind of human experience. Given what we know from 
our empirical sciences of boredom, the co-existence of the features from 
trait boredom and state boredom that we have highlighted as impor-
tant for profound boredom is probably rare. Profound boredom appears 
to be a peculiar mode of existence: one that combines the severity of 
trait boredom with the benefits of state boredom. In the grip of pro-
found boredom, it is as if one experiences trait boredom but only for 
a moment. Because of the severity of this experience, its existential 
use would require us to know how to use it or deal with it. From the 
perspective of human psychology, the occurrence of profound bore-
dom is extraordinary; and its successful implementation as a catalyst to 
propel us toward what is authentically ours is extremely difficult. But 
that does not make profound boredom less real. And in no way does it 
Table 1 A comparison of profound boredom, state boredom, and trait bore-
dom. Shaded boxes indicate the features of trait and state boredom that we 
suggest can help us understand profound boredom
Features of 
profound 
boredom 
Totalizing Ontologically/ 
Existentially 
revealing 
Renders one an 
undifferentiated no one 
Promotes 
authentic 
existence 
Relates to 
philosophizing 
Trait boredom Yes Yes Yes No No 
State boredom No No No Yes Perhaps 
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vitiate its philosophical and existential significance. “All things excellent 
are as difficult as they are rare,” Spinoza reminds us at the end of his 
Ethics (Spinoza, Vp42s). The same fact holds, it seems, for fundamental 
attunements.
Notes
 1. The distinction between state boredom and trait boredom also allows 
us to make sense of various discussions of boredom in the history of 
philosophy. For instance, acedia, ennui, and tedium vitae can be use-
fully and perspicuously explicated in terms of those two constructs.
 2. Space in the present chapter does not permit us to offer a comprehen-
sive review of the empirical literature on boredom. For recent reviews 
on the nature of state boredom, see Eastwood et al. (2012), Elpidorou 
(2018a), and Westgate and Wilson (2018).
 3. For a comprehensive and extraordinarily helpful account of the way in 
which this lecture course is a radicalization of fundamental ontology, 
see de Beistegui (2003).
 4. It is worth noting that already in his 1924 lecture course The Concept of 
Time (CT ), Heidegger raises the possibility of understanding boredom 
in terms of the lengthening of time. See CT 14–17.
 5. Some of the following discussion is an expansion of Freeman’s (forth-
coming) discussion of boredom. Heidegger’s account of boredom is 
also discussed in Freeman and Elpidorou (2015) and Slaby (2014).
 6. With regards to contemporary boredom, Heidegger does not say 
a whole lot. His brief discussion occurs in FCM §18c, §§37–38. 
Nevertheless, what he does say is interesting on many levels (if not 
problematic, politically), insofar as it gestures toward an impor-
tant shift in his thinking that occurs in the 1930s, namely, away 
from being focused on fundamental ontology through an interroga-
tion of Dasein and toward a focus on history and on the co-respond-
ence with the truth of being in its epochal unfolding (de Beistegui 
2003, 63). Given that Heidegger’s discussion of contemporary bore-
dom is quite short, we can at most speculate as to what he might 
mean. A comprehensive and compelling reconstruction and inter-
pretation of contemporary boredom can be found in de Beistegui 
(2003, 68–80). There, he problematizes Heidegger’s account of 
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contemporary boredom vis-à-vis Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s 
attunement (in both BT and in FCM), fleshes it out within the con-
text of Heidegger’s critique of Kulturphilosophie (in FCM) and also in 
terms of how, collectively, profound boredom announces the great his-
torical Grundstimmung that will both identify and define Heidegger’s 
thought in the 1930s. De Beistegui shows how Heidegger’s discussion 
of contemporary boredom bears a direct relation to the reprehensi-
ble and unforgivable political ideas and ideals that Heidegger held 
in the 1920s and 1930s. When de Beistegui was writing, the grav-
ity of Heidegger’s commitment to these ideas and ideals was less cer-
tain than it is now in the aftermath of the publication of the Black 
Notebooks.
 7. An affective phenomenon (or affect) is self-luminous if the tokening of 
that phenomenon (or affect) is transparent to the agent. That is to say, 
an affect is self-luminous if the having of that affect guarantees that we 
are aware of having that affect. Not every affect is self-luminous—we 
might experience jealousy or guilt without knowing it. Furthermore, 
not every token of a type of affect that is typically self-luminous (e.g., 
anger) is necessarily self-luminous. Using this notion of self-luminosity, 
one could hold that boredom as a type is typically self-luminous even if 
not every concrete experience of boredom is.
 8. One could add that there is an additional reason why state boredom 
cannot be profound boredom: the latter is historical whereas the former 
is ahistorical. Although this is one possible reading of state boredom, 
it is not the only one. Indeed, there are those who maintain that bore-
dom is a state or experience that is historical insofar as it distinctive of 
modernity. See, e.g., Spacks (1995).
 9. Perhaps one could argue that trait boredom is the symptom of some-
thing more fundamental—an ontological feature or aspect of human 
existence. Trait boredom is thus grounded in ontology even if it itself is 
not ontological; moreover, profound boredom should be identified not 
with trait boredom but with its ground. Whatever one makes of such 
a proposal, it is not one that corresponds to either a traditional under-
standing of boredom or to a scientific one. Neither commonsense nor 
the psychology of boredom talks of the ontological ground of boredom.
 10. Heidegger’s most extensive discussion of formal indication can be 
found in his WS 1921–1922 lectures (PIA ). The topic of formal indi-
cation and its relationship to philosophy also arises in PRL, GA 63, and 
“Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews” in PM. Among 
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others, Crowell (2001), Dahlstrom (1994), Kiesel (1993), MacAvoy 
(2010), and Streeter (1997) offer insightful and helpful presentations of 
Heidegger’s understanding and use of formal indication.
 11. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for asking us to relate 
our discussion to the notion and use of formal indication.
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